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On Your Mark, Get Set, Go! A New Race to the 
Courthouse Sponsored by Holmes Group, Inc. v. 
Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Patents are a significant part of our nation’s economy. 
Companies invest billions of dollars annually in patents covering 
innovative products and services.1 In some fields, such as the high-
technology industry, a company must make substantial investments 
in research and patent protection to remain competitive.2 Certainty 
and consistency in adjudications of patent issues are important so 
that companies and other parties who invest in patents have some 
confidence in their patent protection.3 Before the formation of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, some 
commentators expressed a belief that consistency in the patent law 
arena could only be achieved through specialized courts that were 
experienced with patent issues,4 which include “some of the most 
complex and time-consuming issues the courts consider.”5 In 1982, 
 
 1. For example, revenue from patent licensing in the United States increased from 
“$15 billion in 1990 to more than $100 billion in the year 2000.” CRAIG HOVEY, THE 
PATENT PROCESS: A GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE 189 
(2002). 
 2. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 247, 261 (1994). 
 3. See Senator Robert J. Dole, Remarks at The Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of 
the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (May 25, 1982), reprinted in 94 
F.R.D. 347, 355 (1982) (“[W]e must have a more predictable and more uniform judicial 
environment to enable inventors, investors, and businesses to feel secure with the exclusive 
property rights they supposedly obtain with a patent.”). 
 4. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, 
STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 
67 F.R.D. 195, 234 (1975) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON REVISION]; see, e.g., Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1, 1 (1989) (“How long we shall continue to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan and 
authoritative scientific assistance in the administration of justice, no one knows; but all fair 
persons not conventionalized by provincial legal habits of mind ought, I should think, unite to 
effect some such advance.” (quoting Judge Learned Hand in Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. 
Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911))). 
 5. 127 CONG. REC. H27,792 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1981) (statement of Rep. 
Kastenmeier). 
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Congress responded to these cries for consistency in patent law by 
creating the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.6 Since then, 
several cases have defined the scope of the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisdiction, including the recent United States Supreme Court case 
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.7 
In Holmes, the Supreme Court held that Federal Circuit appellate 
jurisdiction could not be based solely on a patent law counterclaim.8 
This Note disagrees with the decision and argues that the Supreme 
Court improperly interpreted Federal Circuit jurisdiction, 
disregarding the recognized congressional goal in creating the 
Federal Circuit of establishing patent law uniformity. As a result, 
Holmes may work to promote inconsistencies in patent law 
adjudications among the federal circuit courts of appeal and prompt 
races to the courthouse between patent owners and alleged infringers 
as each group shops for the most favorable forum in which to 
litigate. 
This Note addresses the limitation Holmes places on the scope of 
Federal Circuit jurisdiction and the likely consequences of the 
Court’s decision. In Part II, this Note describes the state of patent 
law prior to the establishment of the Federal Circuit and recounts 
the subsequent development of the law concerning the patent law 
jurisdiction of this specialized court. Part III presents the facts of and 
the decision in Holmes, including the two concurring opinions. In 
Part IV, this Note analyzes the Court’s reliance on the well-pleaded-
complaint rule, through strict textual interpretation of the “arising 
under” language of 28 U.S.C. § 1338, for limiting the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdiction. In addition, Part IV explains how federalism 
concerns do not apply in appellate jurisdiction questions and argues 
that policy considerations behind the creation of the Federal Circuit 
should have militated a different holding by the Court. Finally, Part 
V offers a brief conclusion. 
 
 
 6. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA), Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 7. 122 S. Ct. 1889 (2002). 
 8. 122 S. Ct. at 1895. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Pre-Federal Circuit Patent Law 
Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the state of 
patent law was anything but consistent.9 It was well settled that the 
United States district courts had original jurisdiction over cases 
“arising under” the patent laws,10 and appeals were filed by 
geographic jurisdiction in the various circuit courts of appeal.11 
However, because each appellate court reviewed patent decisions in 
its geographic area, regional biases surfaced among the circuits. For 
example, some circuits imposed higher standards on patentees 
attempting to assert the validity of their patents.12 Other circuits 
were known for being pro-patentee.13 Varying standards among the 
circuits14 and other factors caused uncertainty and great concern to 
American businesses that did not know if their patent protection 
would be sustained in court.15 The inconsistency among circuits also 
 
 9. See COMMISSION ON REVISION, supra note 4, at 220 (relating that “the perceived 
disparity in results in different circuits leads to widespread forum shopping”). 
 10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1976) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety 
protection, copyrights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the 
states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.”). 
 11. The proper appellate court would have been determined under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1294(1) (1976) (an appeal from the decision of a district court was taken “to the court of 
appeals for the circuit embracing the district”). 
 12. Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 6–7 (describing the erosion of the traditional presumption 
of validity for patents under 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)). 
 13. See id. at 7. Dreyfuss cites statistics regarding patent law adjudications between 1945 
and 1957. During this period, “a patent was twice as likely to be held valid and infringed in the 
Fifth Circuit than in the Seventh Circuit, and almost four times more likely to be enforced in 
the Seventh Circuit than in the Second Circuit.” Id. 
 14. See Edward F. McKie, Jr., Patent Precedents in the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in Conflict with Opinions in the Regional Circuits, 15 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 49 
(1983) (highlighting conflicts in patent law decisions between the regional circuits and the 
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals). For an in-depth empirical study of 
patent law decisions before the formation of the Federal Circuit, see generally GLORIA K. 
KOENIG, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1980) 
(analyzing factors and data relating to decisions regarding patent invalidity from 1953 to 
1978). 
 15. Such fear among businesses was not unfounded. One Supreme Court Justice 
remarked that “the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its 
hands on.” Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
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led to forum shopping16 and races to the courts17 by parties seeking 
to have their claims adjudicated by a court favorable to the parties’ 
particular circumstances. 
The confusion prompted Congress, in 1982, to establish the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a specialized court that 
would, among other responsibilities, adjudicate patent law claims.18 
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) provides the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit with “exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from 
a final decision of a district court of the United States . . . if the 
jurisdiction of that [district] court was based, in whole or in part, on 
section 1338 of this title.”19 Members of Congress expressed hope 
that the Federal Circuit could bring harmony among conflicting 
patent law decisions and alleviate the rampant forum shopping by 
parties.20 The specialized subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal 
Circuit would also provide a unique forum for handling the complex 
appellate litigation involved in most patent cases.21 
B.  Post-1982: Federal Circuit Era 
Since 1982, defining the boundaries of Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction over patent issues has been an ongoing judicial task. 
Because most litigated issues relating to the jurisdiction of an 
appellate court did not concern the appellate court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction, there was little case law for the courts to rely on when 
deciding how to direct an appeal of a patent case involving 
jurisdictional questions.22 Initially, challenges arose with respect to 
 
 16. See Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 7. 
 17. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 155 (1973) 
(noting “the mad and undignified races . . . between a patentee who wishes to sue for 
infringement in one circuit believed to be benign toward patents, and a user who wants to 
obtain a declaration of invalidity or non-infringement in one believed to be hostile to 
[patents]”). 
 18. See FCIA, § 127(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000)). 
 19. For the pertinent language of 28 U.S.C. § 1338, see supra note 10. 
 20. See, e.g., 127 CONG. REC. S29,859 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1981) (statement of Sen. 
Dole); 127 CONG. REC. H27,791–92 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1981) (statements of Rep. 
Kastenmeier and Rep. Railsback). 
 21. See, e.g., 127 CONG. REC. S29,861 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1981) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
 22. See Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 25 (“The judicial power of the United States is, on the 
whole, allocated geographically. As a result, there is little law on how to decide when a case 
raising a patent question should be channeled to the patent court.”). 
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the authority of the Federal Circuit to adjudicate non-patent issues 
included in a case having patent law claims in the complaint and with 
respect to which law the Federal Circuit would apply in such an 
adjudication.23 Subsequent cases addressed Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction in actions in which there was no patent law claim 
included in the original complaint.24 
In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., a landmark 
case limiting Federal Circuit jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held 
that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit did not extend 
to appeals from cases wherein the sole patent issue was raised only as 
a defense.25 The Court reasoned that the Federal Circuit’s exclusive 
jurisdiction only extended to those cases that “arose under” an act of 
Congress relating to patents, as required by § 1338.26 In analogizing 
Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction over patent law cases to the 
federal question jurisdiction of a district court, the Court concluded 
that for the Federal Circuit to have jurisdiction over a case “arising 
under” federal patent law, federal patent law must necessarily create 
the plaintiff’s cause of action.27 Thus, the Court summarized that “a 
case raising a federal patent-law defense does not, for that reason 
alone, ‘arise under’ patent law, ‘even if the defense is anticipated in 
the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties admit that the 
defense is the only question truly at issue in the case.’”28 
 
 
 23. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984), 
overruled on other grounds by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 24. See, e.g., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1889 
(2002); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988); DSC 
Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 
1999); Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 131 F.3d 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1997); 
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle, Ltd., 895 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 
1990); Schwartzkopf Dev. Corp. v. Ti-Coating, Inc., 800 F.2d 240 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 25. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809. 
 26. Id. at 807. 
 27. Id. at 808–09 (Federal Circuit jurisdiction under § 1338 “extend[s] only to those 
cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the 
cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a 
substantial question of federal patent law”); see also Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 
211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (for federal question jurisdiction, a “suit arises under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause 
of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution”). 
 28. Christianson, 486 U.S at 809 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers 
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983)). 
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Two years later in Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, 
Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., the Federal Circuit unanimously held that it 
did indeed have jurisdiction over an appeal wherein a patent issue 
was raised in a counterclaim but not in the complaint.29 The en banc 
court distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in Christianson by 
pointing out that Christianson involved a patent law defense.30 The 
Federal Circuit reasoned that, unlike a defense, a counterclaim 
“states a separate cause of action unquestionably ‘arising under’ 
(indeed created by) a patent statute.”31 Refusing to be bound by a 
strict application of the well-pleaded-complaint rule,32 the court 
concluded that it had jurisdiction over counterclaims raising patent 
issues.33 Such was the state of the law until Holmes. 
 
III.  HOLMES GROUP, INC. V. VORNADO AIR  
CIRCULATION SYSTEMS, INC. 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. (“Vornado”) 
manufactures patented household fans and heater fan products34 and 
has sought to enforce its intellectual property rights through 
litigation. In 1992, Vornado initiated a lawsuit against a competitor 
claiming that the competitor infringed the trade dress of Vornado’s 
fans by using a certain “spiral grill design.”35 On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order  
 
 
 29. 895 F.2d 736, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc). 
 30. Id. at 741. 
 31. Id. at 742. 
 32. Id. at 741 (saying that “[the Supreme Court] did not intend to make a rigid 
application of the well-pleaded-complaint rule a Procrustean bed for [Federal Circuit] 
jurisdiction”); see also id. at 743 (“[T]he phrase ‘well-pleaded complaint’ is merely the name of 
the rule, not a statement of a principle of law.”). 
 33. For a brief discussion of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Aerojet as it relates to 
Federal Circuit jurisdiction based on a counterclaim, see John Donofrio & Edward C. 
Donovan, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.: The Application of Federal Question 
Precedent to Federal Circuit Jurisdiction Decisions, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1835, 1868–75 (1996) 
(arguing that Federal Circuit jurisdiction should encompass the appeal of patent law issues 
raised in a permissive counterclaim or a compulsory counterclaim filed in district court). 
 34. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1889, 
1892 (2002). 
 35. Id. 
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issuing an injunction in favor of Vornado and held that Vornado had 
no protectable trade dress rights in the grill design of its fans.36 
Notwithstanding the adverse decision of the Tenth Circuit, four 
years later Vornado filed a complaint with the United States 
International Trade Commission (“ITC”) against Holmes Group, 
Inc. (“Holmes”).37 Vornado claimed that Holmes’s sale of fans and 
heaters with a spiral grill design infringed Vornado’s patent rights 
and infringed the same trade dress that was the subject of the Tenth 
Circuit litigation.38 Several weeks later, Holmes filed an action in the 
United States District Court for the District of Kansas seeking a 
declaratory judgment that its products did not infringe Vornado’s 
trade dress but sought no declaration with respect to Vornado’s 
patent rights. Holmes also sought a preliminary injunction 
restraining Vornado from accusing Holmes of trade dress 
infringement in promotional materials.39 In response to Holmes’s 
declaratory judgment action, Vornado asserted a compulsory 
counterclaim that raised allegations of patent and trade dress 
infringement, the same issues that were raised in the earlier ITC 
complaint.40 
The district court granted Holmes a declaratory judgment of 
non-infringement and a preliminary injunction based on the 
collateral estoppel effect of the 1992 Tenth Circuit decision.41 
Vornado contended that an intervening Federal Circuit decision, 
Midwest Industries, Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc.,42 which disagreed 
 
 36. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1510 
(10th Cir. 1995). 
 37. Certain Spiral Grilled Products Including Ducted Fans and Components Thereof, 
65 Fed. Reg. 4260 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Jan. 26, 2000) (notice of investigation). It is 
interesting to note that under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6) the Federal Circuit would have 
jurisdiction over an appeal from the decision of the ITC concerning unfair practices in import 
trade. 
 38. See Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1892. 
 39. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 
1140–41 (D. Kan. 2000). Interestingly enough, this was the same court in which Vornado had 
brought its action against Duracraft in 1992. That action resulted in the judgment against 
Vornado. See id. at 1141. 
 40. Brief for Respondent at 4, Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 
Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1889 (2002) (No. 01-408). 
 41. Holmes, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1143–44. 
 42. 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999), overruled in part by TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. 
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
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with the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit,43 constituted a change in 
the law of trade dress, and, thus, collateral estoppel did not apply.44 
The district court rejected this argument by concluding that it was 
bound by Tenth Circuit law, which had not changed since the 
previous case, and that Vornado was estopped from re-litigating the 
trade dress claims.45 The district court added that Vornado’s 
counterclaim for infringement would be dismissed if the declaratory 
judgment and the injunction were affirmed on appeal.46 
Vornado appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, which subsequently vacated the district court’s summary 
judgment and remanded for consideration whether the “change in 
the law” exception to collateral estoppel applied in view of the 
Supreme Court case TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, 
Inc.47 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the 
Federal Circuit properly asserted jurisdiction over the appeal.48 
B.  Majority Opinion 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia phrased the issue in the 
case as “whether the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
appellate jurisdiction over a case in which the complaint does not 
allege a claim arising under federal patent law, but the answer 
contains a patent-law counterclaim.”49 To address this question of 
jurisdiction, the Court first turned to select federal statutes. Defining 
the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit as it relates to patent law, 28 
 
 43. Id. at 1364 (expressly rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Vornado: “The Tenth 
Circuit stands alone [among other federal appellate courts] in . . . ruling that trade dress 
protection is unavailable for a product configuration that is claimed in a patent and is a 
‘described, significant inventive aspect’ of the patented invention, even if the configuration is 
nonfunctional.” (quoting Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 
1510 (10th Cir. 1995))). 
 44. Holmes, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1143 (“It is well established that an intervening change in 
the law can be a sufficient basis for declining to apply collateral estoppel.”). 
 45. Id. at 1144–45. 
 46. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1889, 1892 
(2002). 
 47. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 13 Fed. Appx. 961, 2001 
WL 712760 (Fed. Cir.) (remanding in view of TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 
532 U.S. 23 (2001) (resolving circuit split between the Tenth Circuit’s Vornado and the 
Federal Circuit’s Midwest Industries)). 
 48. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 534 U.S. 1016 (2001) 
(cert. granted). 
 49. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1892. 
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U.S.C. § 1295 states that the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over “an appeal from a final decision of a district court of 
the United States . . . if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in 
whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title.”50 Section 1338(a), in 
turn, provides that a district court “shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to 
patents.”51 From these two sections, the Court determined that “the 
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is fixed with reference to that of the 
district court, and turns on whether the action arises under federal 
patent law.”52 
The Court then proceeded to compare the “arising under” 
phrase of § 1338(a) with the “arising under” phrase of § 1331, 
which confers general federal-question jurisdiction on the United 
States district courts.53 Referring to Christianson,54 the Court held 
that to preserve “linguistic consistency,” the same test used to 
determine whether a case arises under § 1331 should also apply to 
§ 1338(a). This test is commonly known as the well-pleaded-
complaint rule.55 
Adapting the well-pleaded-complaint rule to § 1338(a), the 
Court concluded that determining whether a case arises under patent 
law is based on “what necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s statement 
of his own claim in the bill or declaration.”56 The Court then set 
 
 50. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000). 
 51. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 52. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1893. The Court declined to address the question of 
“whether the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is fixed with reference to the complaint as initially 
filed or whether an actual or constructive amendment to the complaint raising a patent-law 
claim can provide the foundation for the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.” Id. at 1893 n.1. 
 53. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) provides: “The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States” (emphasis added). 
 54. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988). 
 55. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1893. The “well-pleaded-complaint rule” is not only relevant 
in determining if a claim “arises under” federal law but also is used to determine whether a case 
is removable from state to federal court: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought 
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original 
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district 
court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where 
such action is pending. 
Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1893 n.2 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). 
 56. Id. at 1893 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 
809 (1988)). 
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forth two ways in which to determine, based on the plaintiff’s 
complaint, that a case arises under patent law. First, the plaintiff’s 
well-pleaded complaint may establish that “federal patent law creates 
the cause of action.”57 Second, the case arises under patent law if 
“the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a 
substantial question of federal patent law.”58 
The Court rejected Vornado’s assertion that the well-pleaded-
complaint rule allows for a counterclaim to serve as a basis for the 
district court’s “arising under” jurisdiction. Referring to case law 
concerning whether federal jurisdiction for an action exists in 
general, the Court concluded that determining “whether a case arises 
under federal patent law ‘cannot depend upon the answer’” and, 
thus, cannot depend on a counterclaim.59 
To support its conclusion, the Court identified three 
longstanding policies that would be undermined if a counterclaim 
could be used to establish “arising under” jurisdiction. First, the 
Court noted that the plaintiff would cease to be “the master of the 
complaint,” and the defendant would be allowed to control the 
litigation forum by being “the master of the counterclaim.”60 
Second, allowing the defendant to be the “master of the 
counterclaim” could “radically expand” the class of cases removable 
from state to federal courts.61 Third, the Court explained that 
“allowing responsive pleadings by the defendant to establish ‘arising 
under’ jurisdiction would undermine the clarity and ease of 
administration of the well-pleaded-complaint doctrine, which serves 
as a ‘quick rule of thumb’ for resolving jurisdictional conflicts.”62 
The Court also rejected Vornado’s assertion that the phrase 
“arising under” in § 1338 should be interpreted differently when 
ascertaining Federal Circuit jurisdiction.63 To support its assertion, 
Vornado referred to Congress’s reasoning for creating the Federal 
 
 57. Id. (quoting Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809). 
 58. Id. (quoting Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809). 
 59. Id. at 1893–94 (citing The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 
(1913)). 
 60. Id. at 1894. 
 61. Id. (asserting that “expand[ing] the class of removable cases . . . [would be] contrary 
to the ‘[d]ue regard for the rightful independence of state governments’” (quoting Shamrock 
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941))). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1895. 
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Circuit, such as promoting patent law uniformity, preventing forum 
shopping, and encouraging industrial innovation.64 The Court, 
however, refused to engage in a subjective analysis of the 
congressional policies and stated that the case was simply one of 
statutory interpretation.65 The Court also noted that the “arising 
under” language did not even appear in 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), the 
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction-conferring statute. Instead, the 
language was a part of § 1338, where it had been “well established 
that ‘arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents’ invokes, 
specifically, the well-pleaded-complaint rule.”66 The Court stated 
that “[i]t would be an unprecedented feat of interpretive 
necromancy to say that § 1338(a)’s ‘arising under’ language means 
one thing (the well-pleaded-complaint rule) in its own right, but 
something quite different (respondent’s complaint-or-counterclaim 
rule) when referred to by § 1295(a)(1).”67 Reaching this conclusion, 
the Court vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded 
the case with instructions to transfer the case to the Tenth Circuit.68 
C.  Concurring Opinions 
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment of the Court and 
agreed that the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit is fixed with 
reference to the district court, but he noted that such assignment of 
jurisdiction should not occur until the notice of appeal is filed.69 He 
reiterated his concern from Christianson70 that an amendment to an 
original complaint not containing a patent law claim could serve as a 
basis for Federal Circuit jurisdiction if the amendment contained a 
patent law claim.71 Justice Stevens claimed that “[a]ny other 
 
 64. Brief for Respondent at 21, Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 
Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1889 (2002) (No. 01-408). 
 65. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1895 (“Our task here is not to determine what would further 
Congress’s goal of ensuring patent-law uniformity, but to determine what the words of the 
statute must fairly be understood to mean.”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 70. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 823–24 (1988) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
 71. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1896 (Stevens, J., concurring). The majority in Christianson, 
like the majority in Holmes, recognized the issue of the amended complaint raising a patent law  
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approach ‘would enable an unscrupulous plaintiff to manipulate 
appellate court jurisdiction by the timing of the amendments to its 
complaint.’”72 
Though Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that 
§ 1295(a)(1) excludes from the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction cases in 
which a patent claim is only raised in a counterclaim, he recognized 
that “there is well-reasoned precedent” supporting the opposite 
conclusion.73 He then submitted that the three policies identified by 
the Court as supporting the use of the well-pleaded-complaint rule 
in determining district court jurisdiction applied as well to the 
question of appellate court jurisdiction.74 Justice Stevens also stated 
that an occasional conflict between courts with a broader jurisdiction 
and specialized courts could be useful in identifying cases that merit 
the attention of the Supreme Court and may be helpful in providing 
an “antidote to the risk that the specialized court may develop an 
institutional bias.”75 
In a separate concurrence, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice 
O’Connor, took exception with the Court’s analysis and concluded 
that “when the claim stated in a compulsory counterclaim ‘aris[es] 
under’ federal patent law and is adjudicated on the merits by a 
federal district court, the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over that adjudication and other determinations made in 
 
claim, but the Court specifically chose not to address it. See supra notes 26–29 and 
accompanying text. 
 72. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1896 (quoting Christianson, 486 U.S. at 824). 
 73. Id. Justice Stevens specifically disagrees here with Justice Scalia’s comment that 
allowing a patent law counterclaim to serve as a separate basis for a district court’s jurisdiction 
would involve “an unprecedented feat of interpretive necromancy.” Id. at 1895. To support 
his opinion, Justice Stevens cites cases from five different federal appellate courts that had 
elaborated on the Federal Circuit’s unanimous decision in Aerojet. Id. at 1896. Justice Scalia, 
however, discounts the assertion that there is “well-reasoned precedent” allowing a patent law 
counterclaim to serve as an independent basis for Federal Circuit jurisdiction, noting that the 
cases cited by Justice Stevens never “mention the well-pleaded-complaint rule that the 
statutory phrase ‘arising under’ invokes. Nor do any of [the] cases interpret § 1295(a)(1).” Id. 
at 1895 n.4. 
 74. Id. at 1897. In Justice Stevens’s opinion, the three policies as adapted to 
determining appellate court jurisdiction were as follows: (1) the plaintiff has an interest in 
choosing “the court that will conduct the trial [and] the appellate court as well”; (2) “[t]he 
potential number of cases in which a counterclaim might direct to the Federal Circuit appeals 
that Congress specifically chose not to place within its exclusive jurisdiction” could be 
significant; and (3) “[r]equiring assessment of a defendant’s motive in raising a patent 
counterclaim or the counterclaim’s relative strength wastes judicial resources.” Id. 
 75. Id. at 1898. 
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the same case.”76 Justice Ginsburg cited the Federal Circuit’s 
unanimous decision in Aerojet, which distinguished Christianson and 
“observed that a patent infringement counterclaim, unlike a patent 
issue raised only as a defense, has as its own, independent 
jurisdictional base, 28 U.S.C. § 1338” and asserted that “such a 
claim ‘discretely arises under the patent laws.’”77 Noting that Holmes 
did not specifically concern the plaintiff’s choice of trial forum, 
Justice Ginsburg suggested the sole issue in the case concerned 
“Congress’s allocation of adjudicatory authority among the federal 
courts of appeals.”78 She concluded, however, that no patent claim 
was actually adjudicated in the case and, for that reason alone, 
concurred in the Court’s judgment.79 
IV. RACE TO THE COURTS: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, 
JURISDICTION, AND THE PREDICTED IMPACT OF HOLMES 
Holmes goes too far in limiting the exclusive appellate jurisdiction 
of the Federal Circuit over patent law claims. The Supreme Court’s 
opinion is flawed in three respects. First, the Court improperly 
suggests that Congress, when it drafted § 1295 to establish the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, knew the statute 
would be so limited by the “arising under” language of § 1338 as to 
not encompass patent law counterclaims. Second, because it was not 
clear at the time § 1295 was drafted that § 1338 would be 
interpreted to exclude patent law counterclaims from serving as a 
basis for Federal Circuit jurisdiction, the Court should have deferred 
to the congressional intent behind creating the Federal Circuit, 
which was to establish uniformity in patent law. Third, the Court 
responds to the federal appellate jurisdiction question in Holmes with 
answers concerning state-federal jurisdictional issues. 
A. “Linguistic Consistency” and Statutory Interpretation  
of Appellate Jurisdiction 
The Court grounds its decision in Holmes on “linguistic 
consistency” between § 1338(a) (conferring jurisdiction to district 
 
 76. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 77. Id. (citing Aerojet-General Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 
F.2d 736, 741–44 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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courts over an “action arising under any Act of Congress relating to 
patents”) and § 1331 (conferring jurisdiction to district courts over 
“actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treatises of the 
United States”). The Court suggests that in basing Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction on § 1338, Congress knew that the “arising under” 
language of § 1338 would invoke the limitations of the well-
pleaded-complaint rule.80 From this, the Holmes Court concludes 
that the specific language of the 1982 statute defining Federal 
Circuit jurisdiction did not grant jurisdiction over counterclaims 
raising patent law issues. 
The Supreme Court’s “linguistic consistency” rationale may be 
attacked on two fronts. First, in focusing on the “arising under” 
relationship between § 1331 and § 1338(a), the Court neglected to 
give sufficient attention to the language of § 1295(a), the section 
that actually defines the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. Section 
1295(a) states that the jurisdiction of the district court need only be 
“based, in whole or in part, on section 1338.”81 Thus, the district 
court’s jurisdiction does not have to be based solely, even primarily, 
on § 1338 in order for the Federal Circuit to have exclusive 
jurisdiction over an appeal of a final decision of that court. 
Section 1295(a) suggests that the Federal Circuit may have 
exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal in which a patent law 
counterclaim was raised because the district court would have had 
jurisdiction over that counterclaim in part under § 1338(a).82 It is 
true that a compulsory counterclaim need not have an independent 
jurisdictional basis to be heard by a district court,83 but that does not 
 
 80. See id. at 1895. 
 81. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 82. This point was raised by Justice Ginsburg in her concurrence. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 
1898 (“[A] patent infringement counterclaim, unlike a patent issue raised only as a defense, 
has as its own, independent jurisdictional base 28 U.S.C. § 1338, i.e., such a claim discretely 
arises under the patent laws.”); see also DONALD S. CHISUM, 8 CHISUM ON PATENTS 
§ 21.02[5][a][vi][B] (2002); Frank P. Chilar, Remarks at The Ninth Annual Judicial 
Conference of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (May 25, 1982), 
reprinted in 94 F.R.D. 347, 404–05 (1982) (stating that a counterclaim may have an 
independent jurisdictional basis of its own under § 1338). 
 83. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974). A compulsory 
counterclaim is brought in federal district court under Rule 13(a): 
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the 
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction 
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not  
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mean that such a counterclaim may not have another jurisdictional 
basis, such as under § 1338.84 When read together, without focusing 
solely on the “arising under” language, § 1295(a) and § 1338(a) 
provide textual support for Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction over 
patent law counterclaims.85 
The second flaw in the Court’s “linguistic consistency” rationale 
relates to the fact that, in 1982, it was not clearly established law that 
the well-pleaded-complaint rule excluded counterclaims from serving 
as a basis for federal jurisdiction.86 The Court admits in Holmes that 
 
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot 
acquire jurisdiction. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). The district court has supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory 
counterclaims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (“[I]n any civil action of which the district 
courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all 
other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that 
they form part of the same case or controversy . . . .” (emphasis added)). If the compulsory 
counterclaim is not filed, the party is barred from raising it in another proceeding. Baker, 417 
U.S. at 469 n.1. 
Permissive counterclaims, on the other hand, are not forfeited if they are not filed in a 
certain action. WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, 14B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 
2D § 1420, at 156 (1990). They must have an independent jurisdictional basis and are brought 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b). Id. § 1422, at 170. Therefore, a permissive counterclaim raising a 
patent law issue in district court would have an independent jurisdictional basis under 
§ 1338(a). See DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 
1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 84. See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 
736, 742 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that every compulsory counterclaim for patent 
infringement has “an independent jurisdictional basis in section 1338”). 
 85. It has also been argued that the legislative history of the FCIA supports Federal 
Circuit jurisdiction over appeals with patent law counterclaims. Frank P. Chilar, a recognized 
expert on the FCIA who helped draft the Act, noted that the legislative history “assumes that 
‘nontrivial patent . . . counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims’ would cause any appeal 
to be directed to the CAFC [Federal Circuit].” Remarks at The Ninth Annual Judicial 
Conference of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (May 25, 1982), 
reprinted in 94 F.R.D. 347, 405 (1982) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 20 (1981), reprinted 
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 30). 
 86. See WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, 14B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3D 
§ 3722, at 414–15 n.21 (1998) (citing cases supporting the proposition that a counterclaim 
may not serve as a basis for federal jurisdiction). Most of the cases that addressed the question 
of whether a counterclaim may serve as a basis for federal jurisdiction were heard after 1982. 
Only two pre-1982 federal court of appeals cases are identified that addressed this jurisdictional 
question; the two courts came to opposite conclusions. See id.; Duncan v. First Nat’l Bank, 
597 F.2d 51, 55 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979) (counterclaim could be used to establish an independent 
basis for federal district court jurisdiction); Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d 1295, 1303 
(9th Cir. 1975) (“Removability cannot be created by defendant pleading a counter-claim 
presenting a federal question . . . .”), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Jones v. Rath Packing 
Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977). On the other hand, several pre-1982 district cases are cited that 
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it had never been required to address whether a federal counterclaim 
could establish “arising under” jurisdiction.87 Therefore, it was not 
clear in 1982 when Congress defined the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Circuit that such jurisdiction, even if subject to the limitations of the 
well-pleaded-complaint rule, would not encompass compulsory 
counterclaims raising patent law issues. 
B.  Deferring to Congressional Intent to Create a  
Uniform System of Patent Law 
Because it was not clear that the statutory definition of Federal 
Circuit jurisdiction excluded appellate jurisdiction based solely on a 
patent law counterclaim, the Court should have considered the 
congressional policies behind the creation of the Federal Circuit. The 
Supreme Court has previously explained that the construction of a 
statute should not impede Congress’s goal behind enacting the 
statute.88 Federal statutes should not be treated “as a wooden set of 
self-sufficient words,”89 especially in the case of interpreting 
jurisdiction-conferring statutes where “determinations about federal 
jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional intent, 
judicial power, and the federal system.”90 
In holding that the Federal Circuit does not have jurisdiction 
over appeals from cases in which a patent law issue is raised solely in 
a compulsory counterclaim, the Supreme Court undermined the 
clear congressional goal of uniformity in patent law.91 As previously 
 
support the proposition that a counterclaim cannot serve as a basis for federal jurisdiction. See 
WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, § 3722, at 414 n.21; see also Douglas Y’Barbo, On the Patent 
Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: A Few Simple Rules, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
651, 653 (1997) (“Many of the ‘arising under’ cases are difficult to reconcile with one 
another.”). 
 87. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1893. 
 88. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749–50 (1989) (rejecting 
statutory construction that “clearly thwart[ed] Congress’ goal of ensuring predictability”). 
 89. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986) (citing Romero 
v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959)). 
 90. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 n.2 (1988) (citing 
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810) (emphasis added). 
 91. It is widely recognized that one of the main purposes for creating the Federal 
Circuit was to establish uniformity in patent law. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 813; Aerojet-
General Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 736, 744 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (en banc); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 12; 
Donofrio & Donovan, supra note 33, at 1837; Emmette F. Hale, III, The “Arising Under”  
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noted, prior to the establishment of the Federal Circuit, patent law 
was full of inconsistencies and uncertainty.92 It was described as “a 
quagmire of doctrinal inconsistency” in which each circuit developed 
its own interpretation of patent law, resulting in a system that was a 
“forum shopper’s delight and an innovator’s nightmare.”93 Both 
supporters and opponents of the creation of a new specialized 
appellate court acknowledged the inconsistencies and rampant forum 
shopping characteristic of patent law.94 
Congress was concerned with patent law uniformity because it 
believed the inconsistency in the law hindered American business and 
innovation.95 Congress was especially mindful of small businesses 
that did not have the resources to invest in meaningful patents when 
it would be impossible to survive prolonged, expensive patent 
litigation.96 In addition, Congress believed that a “greater uniformity 
and reliability made possible by a national court of appeals” would 
promote the filing of patent applications and the investing in 
commercializing inventions.97 In its decision in Aerojet, the Federal 
 
Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: An Opportunity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA. ST. 
L. REV. 229, 229 (1986). 
 92. See supra Part II(A). 
 93. 127 CONG. REC. S29,861 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1981) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
 94. For comments by those supporting a new specialized court see id. (statement of 
Sen. Dole); 127 CONG. REC. H27,791 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1981) (Rep. Kastenmeier 
recognizing “the expensive and time-consuming forum shopping that characterizes litigation in 
the [patent law] field”); and 127 CONG. REC. H27,792 (Rep. Railsback addressing “the 
problem of forum-shopping . . . practiced . . . around the country”). For comments by those 
opposing the new specialized court see 127 CONG. REC. H27,794 (statement by Rep. 
Sensenbrenner); and 127 CONG. REC. S29,862 (Sen. Baucus acknowledging “that the various 
Federal circuit courts of appeal have interpreted our patent law differently,” which “has 
encouraged forum shopping”). 
Those who opposed the creation of the Federal Circuit were afraid that a specialized 
court would have “tunnel vision” and would reduce the incentive to produce “thorough and 
persuasive opinion[s].” COMMISSION ON REVISION, supra note 4, at 234–35. It was also 
feared that specialized judges would impose their own views of policy and could be “captured” 
by special interest groups. Id. at 235. 
 95. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 16 
(“[U]niformity in the law will be a significant improvement from the standpoint of the 
businesses that rely on the patent system. Business planning will become easier as more stable 
and predictable law is introduced. This can have important ramifications upon our economy as 
a whole.”). 
 96. See, e.g., 127 CONG. REC. H27,792 (statement of Rep. Railsback); 127 CONG. REC. 
S29,859 (statement of Sen. Dole). 
 97. 127 CONG. REC. H27,792 (statement of Rep. McClory) (referring to comments 
made by former Secretary of Commerce Phil Klutznick); see also S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6  
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Circuit also acknowledged these problems had existed and 
recognized Congress’s solution to the problem was to create the new 
specialized appellate court in 1982.98 
The decision in Holmes may be a step backward because it 
reintroduces the same fears and problems that were rampant in 
patent law before the creation of the Federal Circuit. Once again, 
there will be a race to the courts between the patent holder and the 
alleged infringer in an attempt to litigate in a forum favorable to the 
party’s cause. The classic example would be that of the alleged patent 
infringer who tries to win the race by bringing a declaratory 
judgment action99 in a circuit that does not have a pro-patentee 
philosophy. To escape Federal Circuit jurisdiction, the alleged 
infringer would only need to omit all patent law claims from its 
complaint.100 The patentee, on the other hand, would be required to 
bring a compulsory counterclaim alleging, among other things, 
patent infringement.101 As a result, any regional circuit court could 
adjudicate the patent law issue and apply its own law in doing so.102 
 
(1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 16 (quoting comments by General Patent Counsel 
of General Electric Company concerning the effect of stable patent law on innovation). 
 98. See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 
736, 744–45 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc). 
 99. Of course, an action for a declaratory judgment may only be filed if there is an actual 
controversy between the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000). Hypothetically, the patentee could 
control this type of race by not creating an actual controversy, such as by sending a cease and 
desist letter, with a third party. The patentee would have to begin the controversy by filing an 
infringement suit in federal court. 
 100. This classic example is precisely what happened in Holmes, with one unique twist. 
The defendant-patentee (Vornado) in Holmes had already brought an action for patent 
infringement against Holmes before the ITC. In an appeal from a patent law determination by 
the ITC, the Federal Circuit would have had jurisdiction. See supra note 37. However, 
Vornado withdrew its complaint before the ITC in June 2000 because it lacked the resources 
to litigate both its case in the ITC and other cases that were simultaneously pending. See Brief 
for Respondent at 6, Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 122 S. Ct. 
1889 (2002) (No. 01-408). 
 101. See discussion supra note 83 (concerning compulsory counterclaims). 
 102. It is possible that the sister circuits could defer to Federal Circuit precedent in 
adjudicating these patent issues. Such a scenario would help prevent inconsistencies between 
the circuits. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1552 n.10 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987) (“[T]he regional circuits might elect to apply the patent precedents of this court in 
such cases, just as this court applies regional circuit precedents in areas of law and procedure 
not within its exclusive jurisdiction.”), vacated & remanded with instructions to transfer appeal 
to Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 486 U.S. 800 (1988). The same argument may be 
made for state courts adjudicating patent law issues. See Speedco, Inc. v. Estes, 853 F.2d 909, 
913–14 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“As Congress created this court in order to bring uniformity to the 
national law of patents, presumably the state courts confronted with issues of federal law which 
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This scenario is just what Congress sought to avoid in establishing 
the Federal Circuit.103 
C.  Federal-State v. Federal-Federal Jurisdiction Issues 
The Court also failed to adequately distinguish Holmes as a 
jurisdictional issue between two federal appellate courts from a 
question of jurisdiction between state and federal courts. The former 
includes jurisdictional conflicts between appellate courts over cases in 
which original jurisdiction has already been established for the 
federal district courts. The latter, on the other hand, deals with the 
allotment of judicial power between the state and federal 
government and addresses concerns of federalism and respect for 
states’ general jurisdiction of legal issues. These two concerns are 
wholly separate from each other and merit separate analysis.104 
Instead of addressing policy considerations regarding the 
allotment of federal appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
supported its holding in Holmes, that a counterclaim cannot be used 
to establish “arising under” jurisdiction, with three policies that are 
mostly relevant in the state-federal jurisdiction context.105 The first 
policy raised by the Court is concerned with a defendant being able 
to remove a case, defeating the plaintiff’s choice to file in state court, 
solely by raising a federal law counterclaim.106 Although this policy is 
well established for a case originally filed in a state court,107 it is less 
 
relate to patents will therefore . . . look to the decisions of this circuit for guidance.”). But, the 
sister circuits and the states are not bound by Federal Circuit law and could choose to apply 
their own law in these situations. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. 
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 650–51 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Federal Circuit “has no 
power to review state court decisions on questions of patent law.”). 
 103. This argument is supported by Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Holmes. Justice 
Ginsburg suggested that the Federal Circuit would have exclusive jurisdiction over a patent law 
counterclaim that was actually adjudicated in the district court. Holmes Group, Inc. v. 
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1889, 1898 (2002). 
 104. For a brief discussion of the difference between state versus federal and federal 
versus federal jurisdictional problems, see Donofrio & Donovan, supra note 33, at 1861–65. 
 105. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. 1889. As previously discussed, Justice Stevens in his concurring 
opinion acknowledges that the Court’s policy reasons were not sufficient and not applicable to 
the facts of the case. See supra note 74. However, this Note’s criticisms of the three policies 
discussed in the majority opinion also apply to the “modified” policy arguments presented in 
Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion. 
 106. It is assumed under this analysis that the plaintiff chooses to file in state court in 
order to obtain some advantage over litigating in the federal system. 
 107. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 
(1983) (“[A] defendant may not remove a case to federal court unless the plaintiff’s complaint 
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relevant to the Holmes situation where the action is originally filed in 
a federal district court. The Holmes situation concerned which 
appellate forum was appropriate, not the original forum in which the 
suit was filed. The only reason the plaintiff would be concerned with 
choosing an appellate forum, by including or not including a patent 
claim in the complaint, is if there was a difference in the law between 
the circuit courts of appeal.108 But it is this difference in adjudications 
relating to patent law that prompted the creation of the Federal 
Circuit in the first place. Thus, the decision in Holmes works to 
create a forum shopping opportunity between the Federal Circuit 
and the regional circuits, an opportunity Congress sought to 
foreclose. 
Second, the Court was afraid of “radically expand[ing] the class 
of removable cases, contrary to the ‘[d]ue regard for the rightful 
independence of state governments.’”109 Again, this policy 
consideration does not apply to the federal appellate jurisdictional 
issues in this case, in which the case is initially brought in federal 
court. Adapting this policy to the situation presented in Holmes, if a 
compulsory counterclaim were used to establish Federal Circuit 
appellate jurisdiction, the caseload of the Federal Circuit would 
arguably not increase at all since the Federal Circuit has already been 
hearing cases in which its jurisdiction was based solely on a 
compulsory counterclaim.110 
To the contrary, the Holmes decision may work to decrease the 
number of patent cases before the Federal Circuit in two ways. First, 
future cases that the Federal Circuit would have heard in which the 
jurisdiction was based on a compulsory counterclaim will now be 
distributed to the regional circuits in which the action was originally 
 
establishes that the case ‘arises under’ federal law.”). Though states may entertain patent 
questions that do not “arise under” federal patent law, some states have declined to adjudicate 
patent law issues. See CHISUM, supra note 82, at § 21.02[1][e] (2002) (citing state 
adjudications of patent issues and states that have declined to address patent issues). 
 108. Justice Stevens makes this observation in his concurring opinion. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. 
at 1897 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 109. Id. at 1894 (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 
(1941)). 
 110. For an example of such a case, see Aerojet-General Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, 
Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc). This argument also addresses 
the concern of Justice Stevens that “[t]he potential number of cases in which a counterclaim 
might direct to the Federal Circuit appeals that Congress specifically chose not to place within 
its exclusive jurisdiction is . . . significant.” Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1897 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
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brought. Second, it is likely that the number of cases filed with a 
“well-pleaded complaint,” purposely omitting a patent law claim, 
will increase as plaintiffs race to file declaratory judgments before the 
patentee files an infringement action with a patent law claim.111 
The third policy identified by the Court is probably the most 
pertinent to the issue present in Holmes: allowing a counterclaim to 
establish “arising under” jurisdiction would undermine the clarity 
and ease of administration in resolving jurisdictional conflicts. In a 
state-federal jurisdictional question it is important to establish early 
on in the case the forum in which the parties are to litigate.112 The 
well-pleaded-complaint rule can serve as a “quick rule of thumb” for 
judges trying to make that determination.113 In the federal-federal 
jurisdictional questions for the appellate court, the need for such a 
“quick rule of thumb” is not as great. The question of appellate 
jurisdiction in most cases would not arise until the end of the case, 
and even then, not all cases would be appealed. The only time a 
jurisdictional question may arise earlier is if the district court must 
decide which law to apply, between the law of the Federal Circuit 
and the law of a sister circuit, to a given set of circumstances. Again, 
such a conflict in law between the Federal Circuit and a sister circuit 
would only arise if other circuits could apply their own law to patent 
issues. Thus, this third policy for not allowing a patent law 
counterclaim to establish “arising under” jurisdiction becomes 
pertinent only when a patent law counterclaim is not allowed to 
establish “arising under” jurisdiction. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Compulsory counterclaims that raise a patent law claim in federal 
district court should have an independent basis for Federal Circuit 
appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s decision in Holmes, 
however, reaches the opposite conclusion and goes too far in 
limiting the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. In attempting to 
answer appellate jurisdictional questions with the well-pleaded-
complaint rule, the Court conflates federal-federal appellate 
 
 111. See supra discussion in Part IV(A). 
 112. This sentiment is reflected in 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2000), which sets forth the 
procedure for removal. Section 1446(b) establishes a thirty-day time period following the 
receipt of the initial pleadings in which a defendant must file a notice of removal. 
 113. Holmes, 122 S. Ct. at 1894. 
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jurisdiction with state-federal jurisdiction issues. In doing so, the 
Court undermines the congressional policy of bringing uniformity to 
patent law through the establishment of the Federal Circuit. In 
addition, the Court’s decision may reintroduce inconsistencies and 
forum shopping in patent law cases and spark races to the courthouse 
between patentees and alleged patent infringers. In summary, Holmes 
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. could undercut 
the foundation of uniform patent law that the Federal Circuit has 
helped establish over the past twenty-one years, a foundation that 
provides vital support for the economy and businesses of the United 
States. 
Christian A. Fox 
 
